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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
ALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKI W. GURNEY,

SUPREME COURT
NO. 20080099

Defendants/Petitioners.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter from a judgment of the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(a) Utah Code Ann.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court granted Certiorari as to the following issues:
1. Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
inclusion of equitable claims among those settled did not preclude an award of
prejudgment interest.
2. Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
district court's award of prejudgment interest for the parties' settlement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision to allow or deny an award of
prejudgment interest is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Smith v.
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Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Utah 2003). However, the analysis established
by this Court for determining whether to allow or deny prejudgment interest necessarily
requires the trial court to make factual determinations. The trial court is required to make
a determination as to whether the injury and consequent damages are complete and
ascertainable as of a particular time. The trial court must also determine whether the
amount of damages is capable of being calculated in accordance with fixed rules of
evidence and known standards of value. Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003,
1006 (Utah 1907). Such factual determinations are reviewed to determine whether there
is substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision. See also Carlson Distributing
Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., 95 P.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Utah App. 2004) and Davies v.
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267, 70 (Utah App. 1987) (relying upon factual findings made by
the trial court in analyzing entitlement to prejudgment interest). The trial court's
determinations will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies, supra. The
standard of review is in substance one of mixed law and fact.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The prejudgment interest rate is established by Section 15-1-1 Utah Code Ann.
which states:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
2

(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penally or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This is an action to recover damages for the costs of labor and materials used to
remodel and construct additions to a home. The plaintiff/respondent is Iron Head
Construction, Inc., (hereinafter "Iron Head"). The defendants/petitioners are Alan K.
Gurney and Vicki W. Gurney (hereinafter "the Gurneys"). Iron Head's Complaint
alleged four causes of action: breach of contract, quantum meriut, unjust enrichment, and
for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Trial was held in this action on November 10, 2003. On the third day of trial the
parties entered into a settlement agreement that resolved the case in part. The parties
stipulated that the principal amount owing from the Gurneys to Iron Head was
$43,500.00. The settlement was the sum of the payments Iron Head paid to its
subcontractors and suppliers for which the Gurneys had not paid. In agreeing to the
settlement Iron Head essentially agreed to waive its profits and the costs of its own
employees used in connection with the project. The settlement was not global. The
parties reserved for judicial determination the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest
and the issue of validity of the mechanics lien.
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At the commencement of the third day of trial the trial court recessed to allow the
parties to discuss settlement. When the trial reconvened the parties presented an initial
stipulation on the record. The terms of the initial stipulation were: (1) The trial would be
concluded; (2) The Gurneys would pay Iron Head $45,000; (3) The issue of entitlement to
prejudgment interest would be submitted to the trial court for judicial determination;
provided however, that if Iron Head could not produce documentary proof by 3:00 p.m.
that day that it had paid an invoice in the amount of $6,500 to a specific contractor
(Johansen) Iron Head would be deemed to have waived its claim for prejudgment interest.
The trial reconvened at 3:00 p.m. that day. Iron Head produced bank records to
show a payment to the contractor of $5,000. The parties modified their settlement
agreement and presented the modification orally on the record. The terms of the
agreement as modified were: (1) The trial would be concluded; (2) The Gurneys would
pay Iron Head the reduced sum of $43,500.00; (3) The issue of entitlement to
prejudgment interest would be submitted to the court for decision through the submission
of post trial briefs that would be simultaneously filed on December 5, 2003; (4) The trial
court would decide the issue based on the submitted briefs and the evidence presented
through three days of trial; and (5) At the party's option the issue of the validity of the
mechanic's lien could be submitted to the trial court by motion. The trial court accepted
and adopted the parties' stipulation and settlement agreement.
On December 5, 2003, Iron Head filed its Brief In Support Of Claim For
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Prejudgment Interest (R.323-336). On the same date, the Gurneys submitted their PostTrial Memorandum Re: Prejudgment Interest (R.353-361) and the Affidavit of Patrick J.
Kilbourne, CPA, CMA (R. 337-352). On December 16, 2003, the trial court entered its
Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest in the
amount of $12,835.48. (R. 387-389)
A subsequent Order was entered by the trial court on April 13, 2004, stating that if
the prejudgment interest awarded was paid on or before April 14, 2004, the Gumeys
would be entitled to a final judgment releasing and discharging all claims; but if they did
not, Iron Head would be entitled to final judgment ordering payment of the prejudgment
interest awarded. The trial court issued its Judgment on August 11, 2006. (R. 440-442)
The Gumeys appealed the trial court's decision to this Court. (R. 444-445) This
Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 447) The case was briefed
and argued before the Court of Appeals. On January 4,2008, the Court of Appeals issued
its Opinion affirming the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is
titled Iron Head Construction, Inc. v. Gurney, 176 P.3d 453 (Utah App. 2008). A copy of
the decision is attached as Appendix D to Petitioners' Opening Brief.
On February 4, 2008, the Gumeys petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari. Iron
Head submitted its Brief in Opposition to the Writ on March 7, 2008. This Court issued
its Order on April 17, 1008, granting a Writ of Certiorari on the two issues stated
previously.

5

Statement Of Facts
1. Iron Head is a Utah corporation engaged in, among other things, the residential
construction business. In January, 2000, Richard Curtis, representing Iron Head, met with
the Gurneys on approximately three occasions to discuss constructing additions to the
Gurney's existing home. The additions were a large garage, an extension to both floors
of their existing home, and the addition of a brick exterior. (R. 324)
2. The parties orally agreed that Iron Head would perform the construction. A
Master Material List was created that described and stated the costs of material and labor
that was to go into the additions. The costs were stated at $168,558.00. (R. 324)
3. Construction began in early February, 2000. (R. 324)
4. After construction commenced, the Gurneys informed Iron Head that their
lender required a written agreement with Iron Head in order to process their construction
loan. (R. 324)
5. Iron Head obtained a form "Contractor Agreement" from Sevier Office Supply
store and the parties signed the agreement which was dated February 15, 2000. The
parties agreed the materials, labor and costs reflected in the Master Material List
previously prepared constituted the work to be performed under the Contractor
Agreement. (R. 324)
6. After construction commenced The Gurneys made numerous changes in the
scope of the work. In addition to adding the new additions to their home the Gumeys
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decided to do a total remodel of both floors of their existing home together with making
numerous other upgrades, additions and modifications. (R. 324)
7. Richard Curtis met with Alan Gurney on at least one occasion to discuss the
scope of the additional work. Richard Curtis informed Alan Gurney that there would be
additional costs for the changes and Alan Gumey responded that the Gumeys would pay
Iron Head for the additional work and would be fair. (R. 323-24)
8. Representatives of Iron Head and other subcontractors had numerous
conversations with the Gumeys; particularly Mrs. Gumey. In those conversations the
Gumeys were informed that the changes and additions to the scope of the work would
cost additional money. The Gumeys responded that it was their house and they wanted it
to be constructed the way that they wanted. The Gumeys responded that the additional
expense was not a problem. The Gumeys acknowledged that they would pay for the
additional changes. (R. 325)
9. The parties did not execute written change orders for any of the changes. (R.
325)
10. In early December, 2000, Richard Curtis met with Alan Gumey in the
Gumeys' home to discuss final payment of the amount due for the construction. Richard
Curtis prepared a final invoice and took it to the meeting. At the meeting Alan Gumey
refused to look at the final invoice and told Richard Curtis that because Alan Gumey did
not know anything about construction, he was going to hire a lawyer and he would pay
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Iron Head whatever the lawyer told him to pay. In that meeting Alan Gumey
acknowledged an obligation to pay for the extra work but disputed the amount. (R. 325)
11. On December 12, 2000, Iron Head filed a mechanic's lien on the property in
the office of the Sevier County Recorder. (R. 325)
12. Because Iron Head incurred costs to construct the Gumeys' home in excess of
the amount the Gurneys paid Iron Head, Iron Head was required to borrow $61,800.00
from Zions Bank to pay the subcontractors Iron Head hired to perform work on the job
and to pay the costs of material. (R. 325)
13. As of November 12, 2003, (the second day of trial) Iron Head had incurred
interest charges on the loan in the amount of $13,048.32. (R. 326)
14. On or about January 5, 2001, Iron Head filed the Complaint in this action.
The Complaint alleges four claims for relief. The first claim is for breach of contract.
The second claim is for quantum meruit. The third claim is for unjust enrichment and the
fourth claim is for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. (R. 326)
15. At the commencement of the third day of trial the court recessed to allow the
parties to discuss settlement. When the trial reconvened the parties presented a
stipulation orally on the record. Initially the parties stated a settlement amount of
$45,000; reserving the issues of entitlement to prejudgment interest and validity of the
mechanics lien for decision by the trial court. (R. 326)
16. There was one unresolved issue relating to an invoice from a subcontractor in
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the amount of $6,500 of which evidence of payment by Iron Head to the subcontractor
had not been presented. The parties stipulated to a three hour break at which time the
court would reconvene to determine if Iron Head could provide documentary proof that
Iron Head had paid the particular invoice to the subcontractor. The parties' stipulation,
as presented, was that if Iron Head could not provide evidence of payment of that invoice
Iron Head would be deemed to have waived its claim for prejudgment interest. If Iron
Head could provide proof of payment, the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest
would be presented to the trial court on the merits. (R 316, 326) (A copy of the minutes
of the trial is attached hereto as Addendum A describing the agreement.)
17. When the trial was reconvened Iron Head provided documentary proof of
payment to the subcontractor of $5,000 of the $6,500 in question. Iron Head also
produced its bank statement to show a charge on July 21, 2000 in the amount of the
$1500 together with proof that the subcontractor made a deposit into its checking account
the same date also for $1500. However, because Iron Head did not have a copy of the
actual check the Gurneys refused to accept that evidence as constituting proof of
payment. To preserve the settlement agreement the parties agreed to reduce Iron Head's
damage figure by the $1500 in dispute. The parties accordingly modified their initial
settlement agreement by reducing the amount owing by $1,500 and preserving Iron
Head's right to claim prejudgment interest. (R. 315, 329-30)
18. The parties stipulated that the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest

9

would be submitted to and decided by the trial court through the submission of post trial
briefs. The issue was stipulated to be decided based on the briefs and based on the
evidence presented through three days of trial. (R. 315)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Prejudgment interest is properly awarded under Utah law when the injury and
consequent damages are complete; the damages are ascertainable as of a particular time;
and the damages can be measured by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value. The trial court correctly ruled that Iron Head's damages were complete and
ascertained as of the date of a December 2000 meeting. Iron Head's damages were
proven at trial with invoices for the costs of materials and labor supplied, invoices and
contracts for the costs of payments made to subcontractors, and time cards and documents
showing employee time and expenses. The damages were capable of calculation based
on rules of evidence and known standards of value.
The Gurneys have failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings that form the basis of the trial court's decision. The trial court's decision, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
The court's award of prejudgment interest was also proper as an award of
consequential damages for Iron Head's unjust enrichment claim. The interest Iron Head
seeks is merely compensation for actual interest Iron Head paid on a loan it was required
to incur to pay for the material and labor incorporated into the Gurneys' home. The
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decision of the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
decision is supported by the court's factual determinations and by Utah law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE MAJORITY OF THE PANEL OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In 1907 this Court established its test for determining whether to award
prejudgment interest in a particular case. In Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88
P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907) this Court stated the rule as follows:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed
before judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and
consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than
be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be awarded for
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by
any fixed standards of value.
The Fell test makes a practical distinction between cases in which damages will
continue into the future and can only be determined by juries using their best judgment;
and cases in which damages are complete and are capable of calculation using fixed rules
of evidence and known standards of value. This Court in Fell elaborated its test by
stating:
In the class of cases, therefore, where the damage is complete, and the
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, there is-there can be-no
reason why interest should be withheld merely because the damages are
unliquidated. There are certain cases of unliquidated damages where
11

interest cannot be allowed. In all personal injury cases, cases of death by
wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
assault and battery, and all cases where the damages are incomplete and are
peculiarly within the province of the jury to assess at the time of trial, no
interest is permissible. But this is so because the damages are continuing
and may even reach beyond the time of trial. Id. at 1006.
Recently in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003) this Court
quoted the Fell test with approval and reaffirmed its adherence to the Fell standard. The
Fell test has been the standard applied by appellate courts in this state since its issuance.
See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995); Bjorkv. April Industries, Inc.,
560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977); and Bennett v. Huish, 155 P.3d 917, 930 (Utah App.
2007).
The test requires a trial court to determine the following: (1) whether the injury
and consequent damages are complete; (2) whether the injury and damages are
ascertained as of a particular time; and (3) whether the damages can be measured by rules
of evidence and known standards of value. These elements are succinctly stated in
Bennett, Id. wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Prejudgment interest is properly
awarded when the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and
the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time." Both the trial court and a majority of
the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the damages suffered by Iron Head satisfy
those requirements.
A. Iron Head's Losses Were Complete And Ascertained As Of A Particular Time
The trial court in its Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest made specific
12

determinations that the injury and consequent damages were complete and the injury and
damages were ascertained as of an early December 2000 meeting between Richard Curtis
of Iron Head and defendant Alan Gurney. The trial court found:
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. Both sides offered
testimony in this case that there was a meeting between Richard Curtis and
Alan Gurney that occurred in the Gurney home in early December of 2000.
This is a meeting where Richard testified that he had an invoice or a printed
statement or bill with him, offered to show it to Alan, but Alan refused to
look at it. It is clear from the evidence that no work was done on that
project after that date. December 31, 2000 is a appropriate date to use to
calculate the passage of time. (R. 388)
The trial court's factual determinations were correct. Iron Head's damages are the
losses it sustained by providing materials and labor to improve the Gurney's house for
which it was not paid. Because Iron Head did no further work on the Gurney's home
after the December 2000 meeting Iron Head did not incur additional damages; other than
interest for the loss of use of its money. Iron Head's damages were complete as of that
date and did not continue.
Likewise Iron Head's damages were ascertained as of that time. At that meeting
Alan Gurney communicated to Richard Curtis the Gurney's decision not to pay Iron
Head's invoice. Indeed, as the trial court found, Alan Gurney refused to even look at
Iron Head's invoice. Iron Head's damages were ascertained as of that meeting because
Iron Head learned at that meeting it was not getting paid; and thus had been damaged.
This case is very similar to Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) in
which the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs damages were fixed for
13

purposes of awarding prejudgment interest from the time the defendant acknowledged an
obligation to pay the plaintiff for his services in constructing duplexes. The Court stated:
The trial court found July 7, 1981, the date defendant Lund signed
the settlement statement, as the due date, as that was the date the benefit
was conferred. // was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an
obligation to pay plaintiffs for their services in constructing the duplexes.
We find that this determination is supported by substantial evidence and
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. Based on this factual determination,
we find the appropriate rate of interest is 10 percent. (Emphasis added). Id.
at 270.
The trial court in this case correctly concluded Iron Head's damages were
complete and were ascertained as of the date of the December meeting.1
B. The Amount Of Iron Head's Damages Are Calculable
In Accordance With Fixed Rules Of Evidence And Known Standards Of Value
Iron Head suffered damages in the following amounts for which it did not receive
payment: (1) the cost of the materials it purchased and incorporated into the Gurneys'
home; (2) the amount it paid its subcontractors to pay for labor and materials the
subcontractors incorporated into the Gurneys' home; (3) the money it paid to its
employees in wages, taxes and employment expenses for the time they performed labor
on the Gurneys' home; (4) the profits2 it should have earned by making improvements to
*The Gurneys argue the court randomly selected the date December 31,2000,
because the meeting actually occurred in early December. The Gurneys should not
complain. By selecting the last day of the month the trial court gave the Gurneys the
benefit of any doubt.
2

Under the settlement reached by the parties, Iron Head essentially waived its
claim for lost profits. The $43,500 the parties stipulated to was the amount the parties
agreed were the costs of the materials and labor paid by Iron Head plus the amounts Iron
14

the Gurneys' home; and (5) the interest it lost on these expenses. The amount of all those
damages is capable of being calculated using fixed rules of evidence and known standards
of value.
At trial Iron Head introduced into evidence invoices for all the materials that were
supplied to the job. Iron Head also introduced into evidence written contracts and
invoices for all the work performed by its subcontractors. Iron Head also introduced into
evidence time cards and other employment records showing the hours worked and the
rates of pay and the amount of employee expenses it incurred for its employees who
performed labor on the Gurneys' home.3
The amount of Iron Head's damages is capable of calculation based on the
evidence (known standards of value) presented at trial. That the amount of such damages
was unliquidated or disputed prior to or during the trial does not change the analysis. The
test under Utah law is not whether the damages are in fact liquidated and calculated prior
to trial. Fell supra, at 1006. Rather, the test under Utah law is whether the damages are
"calculable" (Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. 784 P.2d
475, 483 (Utah App. 1989)) or "can be measured by facts and figures" (Bjork v. April

Head paid to its subcontractors.
3

By entering into the settlement agreement Iron Head essentially waived its claim
to recover the costs of its employees used on the job. Nevertheless the trial court was
entitled to rely upon the evidence of such expenses that was presented at trial in making
its decision that Iron Head's damages were capable of being measured by facts and
figures.
15

Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
The only type of damages for which prejudgment interest is not available are those
in which the damages are continuing or are left up to the best judgment of the trier of fact.
The court in Bennett, supra, 155 P.3d at 931 identified those types of cases as follows:
The nature of losses that cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy
are those in which damage amounts are to be determined by the broad
discretion of the trier of fact, such as in cases of personal injury, wrongful
death, defamation of character, and false imprisonment. Bennett, supra,
155P.3dat931.
Iron Head's damages were capable of being calculated with mathematical accuracy
based on known standards of value and fixed rules of evidence.4 The applicable
prejudgment interest rate is ten percent per annum based on Section 15-1-1 Utah Code
Ann. Prejudgment interest at the rate often percent per annum was properly awarded by
the trial court.
C. The Settlement Amount Was Based On Facts And Figures
The Gurneys argue prejudgment interest is not proper because the settlement
amount of $43,500 was "not traceable to any facts or figures." The Gurneys' argument is
wrong both as a matter of law and factually. First, no reported Utah case has ever stated
the requirement that the damages amount must be "traceable" to facts and figures.
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The Gurneys argue interest is inappropriate because no damages were actually
awarded by the trial court due to the parties' settlement. However, the standard is not
whether damages were awarded but whether damages are complete, ascertained and
calculable. Damages suffered by a party are damages to that party regardless of whether
they have been awarded.
16

Notably the Gurneys cite no case to support their argument. The test established by Fell
and followed by its progeny is simply that damages must be capable of calculation based
on fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value. Indeed the exact amount of
damages may be voluntarily reduced by a party or may be disputed without affecting the
right to an award of prejudgment interest. In Bennett, supra, 155 P.3d at 931 the court
stated the rule as follows:
The fact that the parties dispute or reduce the amount of damages
does not in and of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated within a mathematical certainty. (Emphasis added).
Second, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to enable the trial court to
accurately conclude the settlement amount was based on "known standards of value" or
"facts and figures". The Minutes of the trial (attached hereto as Addendum A) establish
that invoices submitted to Iron Head by subcontractors and materials suppliers were
entered into evidence for all aspects of the job. The evidence included invoices for
lumber, appliances, doors, painting, cement, excavation, hardware, exterior, heating and
air conditioning, plumbing, drywall, electrical, fixtures, and other items. There were also
records entered into evidence of employee time cards, payroll records, and tax and
unemployment payments. (R. 315-322)
Additionally the parties presented their settlement agreement to the trial court on
the record. The initial settlement amount was conditioned in part on proof to be presented
later that day that an invoice from a particular subcontractor in the amount of $6,500 had
been paid. When acceptable proof of payment of only $5,000 was presented the
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settlement amount was reduced by the $1,500 difference. (R. 315-322)
The parties were so exact in their calculations the lack of proof of payment of a
portion of a single invoice resulted in the reduction of the settlement amount by the very
portion of the amount of the invoice that was not paid. Because the parties placed that
stipulation on the record and the court indulged the parties in their requested recess to
locate and present evidence relating the payment of the invoice in question, the trial court
was fully aware of the settlement amount and the basis therefor. The trial court was
entitled, and was indeed expected, to rely upon the evidence presented through two days
of trial together with the terms of the stipulations presented on the record in making its
ruling on entitlement to prejudgment interest. That evidence was more than sufficient for
the trial court to accurately conclude that the settlement amount was based on facts and
figures.
The parties settlement amount was in fact based on facts and figures. The trial
court correctly awarded interest. The Gurneys in their Brief as well as the minority judge
of the panel of the Court of Appeals suggests that the "round number"5 of $43,500 was
"plucked from the air". Such was not the case. Notably the Gurneys-the parties
challenging the trial court and the Court of Appeals' rulings- did not make a transcript of
the trial and have not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. In
the absence of marshaled evidence successfully challenging the trial court's decision the
5

The invoice in question was also the round number of $6,500 as was the $5,000 partial
payment which led to the round number reduction of $1,500.
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majority of the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial court's award of
prejudgment interest.
D. The Damages Amount Need Not Be Liquidated As Of The Date Ascertained
The Gurneys argue that prejudgment interest is not allowable in this case because
the specific amount of $43,500 was not fixed as of December 31, 2000; which is the date
the trial court found Iron Head's damages were complete and ascertained. The Gurneys
misinterpret the test established in Fell. The law does not require the amount of damages
to be liquidated as of the date such damages are ascertained. If so prejudgment interest
could never be awarded in any case in which the amount of damages was disputed at trial.
Such is not the law.
See Smith v. Fairfax Realty, supra, 82 P.3d at 1069 (finding that simply because
the parties disputed the value of the property at trial did not change This Court's
conclusion that the jury's determination of the value was ascertained in accordance with
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value.) and Bennett, supra 155 P.3d at
931 (stating the fact that the parties dispute the amount of damages does not mean the
damages are not complete or not capable of calculation with mathematical accuracy).
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MUST BE AFFIRMED
This Court has stated that the question of whether prejudgment interest should be
awarded in a particular case is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. Smith,
supra, 82 P.3d at 1068. Iron Head does not challenge that principle. However the trial
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court cannot make such a ruling without first making certain factual determinations. The
analysis is thus one of a mixed question of law and fact. The factual questions to be
determined by the trial court vary depending upon the facts of each case. In Davies v.
Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) the Utah Court of Appeals expressly
acknowledged that its decision affirming the trial court's award of prejudgment interest
was based upon its conclusion that the trial court's findings regarding such issues were
"supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 270.
Similarly in Carlson Distributing Company v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 95
P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2004) the court recognized that the determination by the trial court
of whether to award prejudgment interest involved both findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The trial court's decision was based upon a factual finding that a deposit of funds
with the court had been made and a conclusion of law that a waiver or rights existed
based upon a failure to object. This court stated: "We see no error in the trial court's
factual or legal determinations in this regard." 95 P.3d at 1179-80.
In this case the Court of Appeals expressly relied upon the factual determinations
made by the trial court. The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case states:
Further, we agree with the trial court that the last day of
December 2000 is an appropriate date from which
prejudgment interest should begin to accrue. Although the
Gurneys are correct that the trial court is not authorized to
make factual findings without a trial, the trial court needed to
establish the "date payment is due " in order to award
prejudgment interest. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 270
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Because both sides offered testimony
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that there was an early December meeting where the parties
failed to reach consensus, and it was undisputed that no
construction was performed on the house after this meeting,
the trial court did not err in choosing the last day of
December as the date from which prejudgment interest would
begin to accrue. (Emphasis added). Iron Head
Construction, Inc. v. Gurney, 176 P.3d 453 (Utah App. 2008)
at paragraph 20.
As a primary basis for their appeal in this case the Gurneys argue that Iron Head's
loss was not fixed as of a particular time and that the court randomly chose the date from
which interest was to run. That argument is in substance a challenge to the trial court's
determination that Iron Head's injury and consequent damages were complete and that
Iron Head's injuries and damages were ascertained as of a particular time.
The Gurneys also attempt to challenge the award of prejudgment interest by
arguing that the amount of Iron Head's damages were never liquidated. To support their
argument they rely upon alleged facts they submitted in an affidavit - post trial.6
The Gurney's appeal is thus an attack on the trial court's factual findings as well as
an attempt to supplement the factual record, post trial. The Gurneys' factual assault is not
allowed under Utah law because the Gurneys have not marshaled the evidence in support

6

The trial court's decision does not reference or cite to the Kilbourne Affidavit.
There is no indication the trial court relied on the affidavit in making its decision.
Likewise, the Kilbourne Affidavit should not be relied upon by This Court because it was
not part of the evidence at trial. It is also inadmissible based on lack of foundation and
because it contains hearsay. The affidavit attempts to state what Kilbourne's
understanding is of the evidence presented at trial; even though Kilbourne was never at
the trial.
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of the trial court's findings. Indeed, the Gumeys did not even have a transcript of the trial
prepared. Instead, they filed with the trial court a certificate that a transcript was not
required. (R. 448 and 449).
When reviewing a mixed question of fact and law this court is required to give the
trial court some level of deference. Wayment v. Howard, 2006 Utah Lexis 152, page 9.
A party appealing a trial court's findings must "marshal all of the facts used to support the
trial court's findings and then show that these facts cannot possibly support the
conclusion reached by the trial court, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
appellee." Id. The Gumeys may not simply cite to the evidence which supports their
position and hope to prevail. Id. In this case, the Gumeys have not even attempted to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. The Gumeys have only cited
to the evidence of their choice and have sought to supplement the evidence on appeal
with a version of the facts not presented at trial.
III. AWARDING INTEREST ON THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT
DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY
The Gumeys argue that awarding prejudgment interest on the amount the parties
agreed was the principal amount owed is contrary to public policy. Notably the Gumeys
have cited no Utah law to support this assertion. Indeed in Bennett, supra, 155 P.3d at
931 the Court of Appeals stated: "The fact that the parties dispute or reduce the amount
of damages does not in and of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical certainty." (Emphasis added).
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There is no basis for concluding that settlements will be less likely if prejudgment
interest is awarded. Although a party from whom payment is sought may be less likely to
settle a case prior to trial if the likelihood of paying interest exists; a party seeking
payment would be less likely to settle prior to trial if there were no likelihood of being
awarded interest. There may be a public interest in encouraging settlements, but there is
no public interest in encouraging smaller settlements. In addition a party from whom
payment is sought would be motivated to delay resolution of a case as long as possible if
the party believed interest would not accrue.
In this case the agreement to submit the issue to the trial court for decision was an
integral part of the settlement agreement itself. There is simply no legal or logical basis
to conclude that requiring the Gurneys to pay prejudgment interest on the money they
agreed was owed to Iron Head is contrary to public policy; when the Gurneys knew they
were voluntarily submitting the issue to the court to decide.
IV. THE MAJORITY OF THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
CONCLUDED THAT PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPER
ON THE EQUITABLE CLAIMS PRESENTED IN THIS CASE
Iron Head's Complaint alleged claims for relief based on breach of contract,
quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. The
Gurneys argue on appeal that prejudgment interest may not be awarded on damages
arising from equitable claims such as quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The
Gurneys argument fails for several reasons.
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First, by arguing that prejudgment interest is not proper on equitable claims the
Gumeys necessarily acknowledge that prejudgment interest is proper for legal claims. The
trial court's decision did not distinguish between Iron head's legal claim for breach of
contract and its equitable claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. There was
ample evidence presented to the trial court to establish the elements of Iron Head's claim
for breach of contract; as well as Iron Head's claims for quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment.
Under Utah law an appellate court may affirm a trial court's decision on any
proper ground. Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App.
1994). The Gumeys are the parties that are challenging the decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court. As such the Gumeys bear the burden of establishing the trial
court's award was for Iron Head's equitable claims; rather than its claim for breach of
contract. To do so the Gumeys are required to marshal the evidence in favor of Iron
Head's breach of contract claim and then show how the evidence was not sufficient to
establish its claim for breach of contract. Having failed to do so, the decision should be
affirmed.
For their argument that prejudgment interest is not proper for Iron Head's claims
of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit the Gumeys primarily rely on two cases from
the Utah Court of Appeals for their argument, i.e. Dejavue, Inc. v. U. S. Energy Corp.,
993 P.2d 222 (Utah App. 1999) and Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835
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P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992). The Gurneys assert those two cases mandate prejudgment
interest not be allowed for equitable claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.
The Gurneys presented the same argument to the Court of Appeals in this case.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Gurneys' argument noting that other cases both from
the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have upheld awards of
prejudgment interest for equitable claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Iron
Head, supra, at 19. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Fell standard should be applied
individually to the facts of each case. Id. The court ruled that it's decisions in Dejavue
and Shoreline should not be interpreted to preclude prejudgment interest in this case. The
court relied upon other cases such as Davies v. Olsen, supra, and Smith v. Fairfax Realty,
supra, in holding that prejudgment interest is proper in this case.
Because the Court of Appeals issued the decisions in Dejavue and Shoreline the
Court of Appeals is presumably in the best position to interpret those cases. As such the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of those two cases should be binding on the Gurneys.
Moreover, in relying on those two cases the Gurneys essentially ignore the Utah Court of
Appeals ruling in Davies v. Olson, supra. 746 P.2d at 270 in which the court upheld the
award of prejudgment interest in a case very similar to this one. In Davies the court ruled
that damages should be awarded based on a quantum meruit theory and that prejudgment
interest should be awarded on those damages.
Iron Head acknowledges that Utah courts have not awarded prejudgment interest
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in every quantum meruit or unjust enrichment case. The courts have analyzed the cases
on a case by case basis to determine if the appropriate requirements for an award of
prejudgment interest have been satisfied. The cases cited by the Gumeys in which
prejudgment interest has been denied are all distinguishable from the instant case.
In Bailey-Allen, supra,, the court disallowed prejudgment interest in that particular
case based on the facts of that particular case. The court stated, "We conclude that any
damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and with accuracy." Id. at 427.
The court did not make a blanket ruling that prejudgment interest is never allowed in
quantum meruit cases.
Similarly, mDejavue, Inc. v. US Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App. 1999) the
Utah Court of Appeals held that prejudgment interest was inappropriate in that case
because the general verdict form did not identify the specific claims on which the
damages award was based. The quantum meruit claim was submitted to the jury together
with claims for relief for forcible entry, unlawful detainer, and conversion; claims for
which the court stated an award of interest would be "highly problematic." Id. at 228.
Again, the court's ruling was limited to the facts of that particular case. The court did not
hold that prejudgment interest is never award able in quantum meruit cases. Likewise,
the case of Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) dealt with the equitable claim of
restitution and is distinguishable from this case.
Whether to award prejudgment interest in a particular case is dependent upon
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whether the damages are complete and ascertained as of a particular date and whether the
damages are capable of being calculated based upon known standards of value and fixed
rules of evidence. The analysis involves more than simply whether the claims are legal or
equitable.
There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to award
prejudgment interest in this case. As such the majority of the panel of the Court of
Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's decision.
V. THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS ALSO PROPER
IN THIS CASE AS AN AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
The testimony at trial established that as of the second day of trial Iron Head had
incurred interest expenses in the amount of $13,048.32 on a loan obtained by Iron Head to
pay its suppliers and subcontractors.7 The interest paid by Iron Head was thus an actual
loss it suffered. In Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah 1989) the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "The purpose of a prejudgment interest award is to
compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or to prevent a defendant's unjust enrichment." One
of Iron Head's claims for relief was for unjust enrichment.
There was substantial evidence presented at trial to support Iron Head's claim for
prejudgment interest based on its claim for unjust enrichment. The interest award

7

The Gurneys greatly benefitted from Iron Head's loan. If Iron Head had not
obtained the loan and paid the subcontractors and suppliers they no doubt would have
filed liens on the Gurneys' home.
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constitutes consequential damages to compensate Iron Head for the losses it suffered by
paying interest on a loan it obtained to pay its subcontractors and suppliers.
CONCLUSION
Iron Head's damages were complete and were ascertainable as of the date found by
the trial court. Iron Head's damages were for its costs incurred in improving the
Gurneys' house. The damages were calculable with mathematical certainty based upon
known standards of value and rules of evidence. Iron Head's losses were actual losses for
which Iron Head was required to obtain a loan and pay interest. The interest paid on
those losses constitute consequential damages.
Iron head's damages were sustainable based on claims of breach of contract, unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit. Prejudgment interest was proper on each of those
claims; including the claims for equitable relief. The decision of the majority panel of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. Iron Head
respectfully requests that result.
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ADDENDUM A

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SEVIER COURT
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION INC.,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
BENCH TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 010600008 CN

VICKI W GURNEY Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

DAVID L. MOWER
November 12, 2003

marilyns, clnd^s, janetb

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION INC.
RICHARD CURTIS
Defendant(s): ALAN K GURNEY
VICKI W GURNEY
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MARVIN D. BAGLEY
Defendant's Attorney(s): EDWIN C BARNES
Audio
Tape Number:
SCD2
Tape Count: 9-00

TRIAL
TAPE: SCD2 On record, Introduction of parties are made to the
court. Judge asks preliminary questions regarding time and
witnesses.
Plaintiff states that he intends to call 5 witnesses
for sure and maybe more. Defendant intends to call five also maybe
more.
TIME: 9:13 AM Judge explains use of the equipment in the
courtroom to the attorneys. Judge asks about the exclusionary
rule. Mr. Barnes has a preliminary matter that he would like
addressed. Mr. Barnes addresses the issue regarding validity of
the lien.
TIME: 9:17 AM Mr. Barnes argues his point regarding contract or
quanto maroit. Second and Third causes of action should not be
argued today because it is admitted in the answer that there is a
contract. There is also the issue of the mechanics lien.
TIME: 9:23 AM Mr. Bagley responds to Mr. Barnes argument. He
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Case No: 010600008
Date:
Nov 12, 2003
gives a brief explanation of the of the case and what he is
claiming. There are two legal claims and two equitable claims
involved in this case.
TIME: 9:30 AM Mr. Barnes argues the plead and prove in the
alternative matter. There are no written change orders in this
matter.
Judge asks questions of Mr. Barnes. Mr. Barnes responds
to Judge's question. He asks that the second and third causes or
action
TIME: 9:34 AM be dismissed. Judge makes ruling that he will
take Defendant's motion under advisment.
TIME: 9:35 AM Opening Statment by Mr. Bagley.
TIME: 9:53 AM Opening statement by Mr. Barnes.
TIME: 10:12 AM Mr. Bagley calls first witness, Mr. Richard
Curtis. He is sworn and testifies that Ironhead is a corporation
with six stockholders. They do general contracting and have a
specialty license in subcontracting in iron work.
TIME: 10:19 AM Richard testifies he met with Alan and Vicki
Gurney in their home and sketched and discussed what they wanted
done to their home as far as remodeling and new building. Sketches
were done and discussed at meetings with defendants. Ex. #1
received.
TIME: 10:29 AM Testimony continues regarding house plan. Ex. #3
received. Mr. Curtis prepared a Master material list to determine
what the approximate cost would be for the addition and remodel.
Mr. Bagley asks that Ex. #2 be offered.
TIME: 10:43 AM Judge asks questions of Mr. Curtis regarding
material list.
Ex. #2 is received for limited purpose at this
time. Mr. Bagley asks Mr. Curtis about the Building Permit. Ex.
#4 received. Building permit is examined by all parties and
testimony received
TIME: 11:09 AM Testimony regarding Designer Marbel Invoice. Ex.
#9 received. Testimony regarding JJWD Invoice. Ex. #10 Received
with the exception of the last page. Ex. #12 (Gas Stove) received.
Ex. #13 (garage doors) received.
TIME: 11:22 AM Testimony regarding Anderson Lumber receipts.
Exs. #14 through 20 received. Testimony regarding Anderson Lumber
and other invoices that were submitted by Frank Johansen for this
project. Ex. #21 received with the exception of an argument
TIME: 11:34 AM regarding foundation for some of them. Judge
takes notice. Testimony regarding CME for cement work done. Ex.
#23 received. Testimony regarding Hales Sand & Gravel invoice.
Ex. #25 received.
TIME: 11:40 AM Testimony regarding Ace Hardware. Iron Head paid
Page 2

Case No: 010600008
Date:
Nov 12, 2003
these invoices. Ex. #27 received. Testimony regarding Robinson
Transport. Ex. #30 received. Testimony regarding Gadcom. Ex. #32
is received. 11:52 a.m. Objection overruled.
TIME: 11:49 AM Testimony regarding Outsiders bill. Ex. #33
received. Sevier Hearing bill testimony. This bill has not been
paid. Ex. #34 received. Testimony regarding Conrad Miller. Ex.
#35 received. Testimony regarding Burke Nay, Drywall Shop. Ex.
#36
TIME: 11:59 AM Mr. Barnes makes objection regarding the drywall
bid and invoice. Judge finds that Mr. Barnes has a continuing
objection regarding cost on all invoices. Ex. #3 6 is received and
overrules Mr. Barnes objection.
TIME: 12:01 PM Recess for Lunch.
TIME: 1:04 PM Back in Session. Mr. Richard Curtis continuing
his testimony regarding Home Style General. Ex #37 offered but
there was an objection so it was not received. Testimony regarding
Kay Williams Electrical. Ex. #38 is received.
TIME: 1:13 PM Testimony continues regarding Coates & Assoc.
Invoice. Ex. #39 received. Testimony regarding Shower Door Fax
Sheet, Ex. #4 0 offered, objection by Mr. Barnes. Objection
overruled and Exhibit is received. Testimony regarding Brienholt
Invoice.
TIME: 1:19 PM Ex. #41 received. Testimony regarding Bud
Pritchard invoice. Question whether this is a duplicate statement
to #23. Judge receives Ex. #42 and states that it will be examined
later. Central Ut. Concrete had to cut a door through the
basement.
TIME: 1:23 PM Invoice was paid by Iron Head. Ex. #44 was
received. Testimony regarding Iron Head's bank account. Checks
were written to suppliers for the Gurney project. Richard had to
take a loan out from Zion's to pay subcontractors. Ex. 63 received.
TIME: 1:36 PM Testimony regarding timecards and money paid to
employees. Witness explains how time is kept and reported. Ex.
#64 offered. Mr. Barnes vore dire regarding this exhibit.
Objection overruled. Ex. #64 is received.
TIME: 1:52 PM Testimony continues regarding time-by-job detail
report prepared by Mr. Curtis, Ex. #65 is received. Tesimony
regarding his Zion's bank account and what is paid through them for
payroll, ins., taxes, and other liabilities. Ex. ^66 received.
TIME: 1:58 PM Testimony regarding payroll for March, Ex. #67 is
received. Payroll records for April through Dec. of 2000 are
offered and testified to. Mr. Barnes makes an objection to
exhibits 71-76. Mr. Bagley questions witness about specifics to
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these exhs.
TIME: 2:08 PM Mr, Barnes objects because of the reference to a
diary and that has not been produced prior to today. Mr. Bagley
indicates that most of it is based on independant recollection and
other sources other than the diary. Judge askss questions.
TIME: 2:20 PM Mr. Bagley continues to question witness regarding
specific details of work that was done after September. Judge
sustains objection regarding exhibits 73-76. Exhibits received are
68-72. Judge also rules that heresay objection is sustained.
TIME: 2:25 PM Testimony regarding Federal Tax deposit checks,
worker's comp and unemployment insurance. Mr. Curtis did make
collections efforts during the month of December. Mr. Bagley moves
that Ex. #77 be received and Judge orders it received.
TIME: 2:44 PM Back in session after recess. Mr. Curtis
continues testimony regarding Notice of Lein, Ex. #78 is received.
Mr. Bagley questions about Lis Pendens that was prepared and filed
on behalf of Plaintiff's, Ex. #79 is received.
TIME: 2:51 PM Mr. Curtis applied for a loan from Zion's bank to
pay the subcontractor's the money for the work they had done. He
cipplied for it personally because it was much faster than doing it
for a corporation. Mr. Barnes objects to exhibit 83.
TIME: 2:53 PM Exhibit #83 is received. Testimony continues
regarding Promissory note of 9-27-00. Mr. Bagley questions the
witness regarding exhibit #73, payroll records of Sept. 2000.
TIME: 3:00 PM Exhibit #82 received. Continued questioning
regarding the payroll records. Exhibit #84 received. Questioning
regarding Exhibit #86, invoice 8-2-00. Exhibit
#86 & #87
received. Testimony continues from Richard Curtis regarding his
invoice.
TIME: 3:16 PM Mr. Curtis testifies that Mr. Gurney had come to
him and requested a final draw on their invoice so that he could
finish up his first loan and get another one. Mr. Curtis testities
that he thought more payments would be forthcoming.
TIME: 3:33 PM Nothing was ever said to Mr. Curtis as to why they
decided they weren't going to pay the balance of what they owed.
Ex. 8 9 is received for illustrative purpose only.
TIME: 3:56 PM Mr. Curtis continues his testimony regarding the
changes made to the job that were not addressed in the initial
plans and additional costs incurred in this project.
TIME: 4:30 PM Mr. Curtis indicates that he feels the only
mistake they made in the house was the floor height for the
addition that was incorrect. The expense for this would be
approximately $200.00 that they would eat the cost of.
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TIME: 4:33 PM Cross examination by Mr. Barnes. Exhibit #5 is
received. Testimony is given regarding this contract that was
prepared and signed by Mr. Curtis. Mr. Barnes questions witness
about his initial meeting with the Gurney's regarding the initial
house plans.
TIME: 4:50 Mr. Barnes questions regarding Contractor Agreement.
TIME: 4:58 PM Court is in recess until Wednesday.
TIME: 9:02 AM Wed. Nov. 12, Mr. Barnes continues with cross
examination of Mr. Curtis. Wit became aware of Gurneys' financial
situation about one month before when his wife contacted Gurneys1
financial institution. Testimony as to how profit was figured.
TIME: 9:40 AM Testimony re: exhibit #89, raising the floor
elevation of the older portion to match the new addition. More
testimony re: exhibt 34.
TIME: 9:57 AM Witness states that as of March, everything that
was paid for that he had asked for. Ex #115 rec'd. Again by May 3,
payment was made that took care of everything that had been billed
for.
TIME: 10:07 AM Sevier Heating has never been paid by Curtis
although Gurneys paid the billing. Gurney asked for an invoice with
"final bill" on it for his banking co. but the invoice did not have
everything on it and there was still more owing.
TIME: 10:12 AM He did not intend it to be the final billing. As
of July 6, 2000 every bill requested had been paid. Wit states he
is not charging Gurneys interest owed to Anderson Lumber. Pla had
other projects that were ongoing at the same time of constructing
Gurneys
TIME: 10:24 AM Recess.
TIME: 11:27 AM Counsel met with plaintiff to review the summary
presented by Barnes and now states the document illustrates those
invoices now in evidence. Exhibits #150 and #116 were rec'd.
TIME: 11:39 AM There is clarification as to which items were
actually for Gurneys and which items were returned.
TIME: 11:48 AM Re: #86 wit explains how he came to the figures
in this exhibit. He cannot tell if the + and - signs were added on
or were part of the original document. Labor charges were not
included in #86. This invoice was not intended to be the final
bill.
TIME: 12:00 PM Court in recess
TAPE: SCD3
TIME: 1:25 PM Court met with counsel in chambers to
see if trial will finish this week. It was agreed that we will
continue through this week and come back at a later time to finish
defense case.
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TIME: 1:27 PM Cross exam continued with Richard Curtis. The last
billing that was left with the Gurneys was exhibit 86. He met with
Alan later to give him another billing, ex #87 but Alan would not
accept it and it was not sent or delivered to the Gurneys.
TIME: 1:49 PM Testimony re: billing for Designer Marble. Gurneys
overbilled $565.
TIME: 2:19 PM Wit does not know what charges were used to
determine the amount listed on the Notice of Lien.
TIME: 2:21 PM Redirect. Approximately $240,000 would be the cost
of the job and $160,000 is the amount Gurneys paid leaving a
balance of $80,000.
TIME: 2:33 PM The number on the final payment request is the
number Gurney put on there. There was never any change order
prepared and Gurneys never asked for one.
TIME: 2:43 PM Bagley reviewed the contract with the witness. He
and Vicki talked about the change in the roof and that it would
increase the cost but she was okay with that.
TIME: 2:55 PM Sevier Heating was questioned about the two
different bids and Jensen said to go with the lesser bid. Aug 2 was
the first Curtis knew that there was going to be heating in the new
addition and that was another change order.
TIME: 3:00 PM At one time Curtis would be willing to accept cost
plus 15% but Gurney was not willing to do that.
TIME: 3:21 PM Wit explained difference in Johansen's billing.
TIME: 3:22 PM Re-cross. Wit explains how he figures the 15%
markup. Mrs. Gurney saw a brochure for the doors and picked out the
doors she wanted but he does not know if she saw the bill from
Anderson Lumber.
TIME: 3:39 PM Court questions witness. Construction began Feb 4,
2000. Wit tells how he processes his invoices referring to ex. 86
and 87. Court asked him to prepare a report correlating the
€ixhibits and his accounting of invoices.
TIME: 3:51 PM Mr. Bagley states that Kay Monroe has prepared a
report like the one the court is requesting.
TIME: 3:52 PM Rick Robinson was sworn and testified that Richard
Curtis applied for a loan on Sept 27, 2000. This loan was for the
operation of his business until monies came in from Gurneys. The
loan was for $61,800, fees included. $60,685 was available to use.
TIME: 4:03 PM Exhibit 113 was rec'd. The loan has not yet been
paid off. Curtis has paid $13,048.32 in interest to date. Ex. #81
was modified and rec f d and wit wrote in the amount of interest paid
by Richard Curtis.
TIME: 4:12 PM The loan has been extended and other smaller
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amounts have been added to it but the interest reported is for this
loan only.
TIME: 4:16 PM Court takes a break while counsel goes over Mr.
Robinson's records.
TIME: 4:36 PM Back on the record.
Mr. Bagley continue questioning the witness stating that the
current interest rate is fixed at 6 1/2 %.
TIME: 4:37 PM Cross-examination by Mr. Barnes regarding the
percentage rate on the loan. It is now fixed. The loan would be
expected to be paid by Richard personally, not listed as Iron Head
Const.
TIME: 4:50 PM Re-direct by Mr. Bagley
TIME: 4:52 PM Court recesses until 9:00 am. on 11-13-03.
TAPE: 11-13
TIME: 11-55AM Court is reconvened. The attys have
been in conference with the parties and there is an agreement that
the Gurneys will pay to Ironhead, $45,000. within 120 days.
TIME: 11:55 AM Prejudgment interest will be outstanding provided
that Ironhead can prove proof of payment to Johansen.
Mr. Barnes states that there is the agreement with proof. They
want to resolve that issue before other issues are argued. There
is an invoice but no payment for $6500. If they cannot prove it was
paid, then it will go away.
TIME: 11:57 AM The lien is for $119,000. Mr. Barnes want it to
stay in place unless the $45,000. is paid on time. If parties need
to refinance, then the payment would go directly to Ironhead. If
Gurneys do not pay, then Iron Head will have a Judgment for
$45,000.
TIME: 12:03 PM Then the parties could come back before the Court
for the validity of the lien. Parties would like to keep that
issue open. Mr. Bagley would like the parties to go on the record
today being in agreement.
TIME: 12:05 PM Court finds that the parties have made an
agreement to pay $45,000. within 120 calendar days. It will
satisfy all of the claims except the pre judgmemt claims. The
trial will be temporarily suspended.
TIME: 12:07 PM If the def's are using theproperty for collateral
they will make sure that there is a release of lien and that the
Pla gets the first $45,000. The pla has agree that it will waive
any claim of pre judg uneless he has proof of payment to Johansen
by 3:00.
TIME: 12:08 PM The agreement is documentation of that payment,
any proof that it has been paid by 3:00 pm today.
TIME: 12:10 PM All parties are in agreement with this. The Court
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approves the stipulation and will be in recess until 3:00 pm today.
TIME: 3:10 PM Mr. Bagley states that they have a bank statement
to a reference that $5000. was deposited and the parties have
stipulated that they will reduce the judgment to $43#500 on that
issue only.
TIME: 3:19 PM If parties seek pre-judgment it could be by
memorandum. He asks that it be payable 120 days after the devision
of the
TIME: 3:21 PM Mr. Barnes asks for a deadline for parties to file
memorandums or briefs.
Court states that the memorandums should be faxed to the Court by
noon on 12-5-03. The stipulation of the parties is accepted and
approved.
TIME: 3:22 PM Mr. Bagley will prepare the order and send to Mr.
Barnes for review before submitting it to the Court.
TIME: 3:23 PM Off record
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